Talks and presentations

Once Bittern, Twice Shy

November 06, 2024

Conference talk, Scottish Programming Languages Symposium (20th anniversary edition), Glasgow, Scotland

HAFLANG presentation at the 20th anniversary edition of SPLS.

Revisiting hardware architectures for lazy functional languages with Heron

March 03, 2024

Conference talk, Various (incl. Workshop on Hardware Acceleration of Functional and Declarative Languages), Edinburgh, Scotland

A presentation covering the HAFLANG project’s single-core processor for a lazy functional language. Details the surface language, hardware graph reduction, and concurrent hardware garbage collection.

PYNQ Bootcamp

July 29, 2019

Workshop, St. Vrain Valley Schools, Longmont, Colorado

A week-long embedded systems bootcamp for 8th–12th grade students, delivered with a mix of talks, hands-on tutorials with Jupyter Notebooks, and specialised breakout sessions. Topics included microprocessors, FPGAs, basic I/O, audio processing, computer vision, robotics, and Python. The students then completed their own hackathon projects on the theme of sustainability. One system was an autonomous janitor that used computer vision techniques to identify trash and clean it up!

PYNQ RFSoC Workshop

June 10, 2019

Workshop, xSight 20, Los Angeles, California

An workshop exploring system design with the Xilinx RFSoC devices, delivered in an hands-on session with Jupyter Notebooks running on RFSoC development boards. Materials cover direct RF sampling, digital up/down conversion, hardware error correction, and fundamental DSP topics. First delivered at Xilinx’s xSight 20 conference to approximately 80 attendees over two days.

TEMPEST Attacks Against AES

September 19, 2017

Conference talk, hardwear.io Hardware Security Conference 2017, The Hauge, The Netherlands

Side-channel attacks can recover secret keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the pervasive AES) using measurements such as power use. However, these previously-known attacks on AES tend to require unrestricted, physical access to the device. Using improved antenna and signal processing, Fox-IT and Riscure show how to covertly recover the encryption key from two realistic AES-256 implementations while: